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WATCH COMMITTEE
of the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

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Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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26 July 1951

No. 51

SUMMARY OF INDICATIONS DURING PERIOD

DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File

1. KOREA: There has been no significant change in Communist propaganda on the cease-fire discussions. Communist commentary up to 25 July provided no indication that the Communists were prepared to withdraw their demand for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea but there was also no threat that they would break off the discussions. On the ground, the Communists have continued to improve their capabilities for a renewal of the offensive or the maintenance of a prolonged defense. The build-up of stockpiles, increased artillery fire, tank sightings and enemy probing actions are indicative of the Communist readiness to resume the offensive, and the present enemy situation is such that final preparations which have preceded previous offensives might not be necessary or could be very rapidly accomplished. No new Chinese Communist units have been identified, although CCF strength in Korea may well be considerably higher than present accepted estimates. An increase in Soviet advisors in Korea has been reported but is not confirmed. Enemy air activity was on a reduced scale during the week but airfield repair continues in North Korea and the effectiveness of enemy AA has steadily increased. There is a probability that Soviet four-engine bombers have made flights into Manchuria.
2. JAPAN: The U.S.S.R. and Communist China have reaffirmed their rejection of the proposed Japanese peace treaty, but there continues to be no clear indication of any definite Soviet move to forestall its being signed by other nations concerned.
3. CHINA: There continues to be no evidence of preparations in South China for any immediate military action, but there are reports of additional air preparations in the area. There has been no indication of a change in general Chinese Communist objectives in Asia in connection with the Korean discussions.
4. TIBET: There are indications that the Chinese Communists are implementing the agreement with Tibet by political methods and by military occupation.

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5. **INDOCHINA:** Viet Minh dispositions and recent losses suggest that they probably will not initiate further major military action for the time being. Despite continuing rumors, there is no reliable indication that a large-scale Chinese Communist intervention is imminent although there is evidence of continuing Chinese long-term preparations for increased support of the Viet Minh.
6. **GERMANY-AUSTRIA:** The assembly of Soviet engineer units and bridging equipment at three locations on the Elbe indicates considerable attention to river crossing training, although it cannot yet be determined whether comprehensive exercises are planned. Unconfirmed reports of the entrance of considerable numbers of Soviet troops into southeast Germany from Poland possibly are connected with training activity but could indicate the arrival of reinforcements. There is now reliable evidence that the departure of the 1927 class from Austria to the U.S.S.R. is under way. The count of jet fighters in Germany continues to increase at a steady but gradual rate, and present dispositions of these aircraft suggest they are engaged in extensive maneuver activity. The appearance of radar stations along the western border of the Soviet Zone probably indicates an increase in early warning coverage and heavier AA guns apparently are being installed at Soviet airfields in Germany.
7. **SATELLITES:** Current call-ups of Bulgarian reservists are apparently on a considerably larger scale than in previous years and the formation of reservist units has been reported. Bulgarian troop dispositions near the Turkish border are probably for maneuver purposes. Molotov's recent speech attacking Tito does not appear to be of immediate significance.
8. **NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST:** There continue to be no clear indications of unusual Soviet military activity on the Iranian frontier. There are increasing indications that the Soviets may attempt an initial penetration of Iranian oil operations through the employment of Satellite oil technicians. Soviet activity in Afghanistan appears to be increasing and Soviet security on the Afghan border has been tightened.
9. **U.S.S.R.:** The significance of the recent reemergence of two capable and formerly prominent Soviet military leaders (Marshal Zhukov and Vice Admiral Kuznetsov) cannot yet be fully determined but may reflect a need for competent professional rather than political leadership in the armed forces. Although recent Soviet gestures, including the appearance of the English language magazine "News" and Soviet agreement to participate in East-West trade discussions, may indicate a change in Soviet tactics, there has been no change in the general Soviet propaganda line which remains hostile to the U.S. A report that Soviet "ham" radio stations have gone off the air has not been verified and the significance of such a development is not clear.

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CONCLUSIONS

1. The Soviet Armed Forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. Military and political indications are that the Communists intend to insist upon a solution of controversial problems strictly along lines which further Communist world objectives. There are no indications that the Soviets and their Communist allies, in pursuing their major objectives, intend necessarily to avoid future actions which might precipitate global hostilities.
2. In Korea, preparations for further enemy military action continue and Communist forces are in a position to launch a major offensive without material warning. There are no indications that the Communists have abandoned their objective of the withdrawal of foreign troops as a basic condition for a settlement.
3. There is no indication of a modification of Chinese Communist objectives in Asia. Further major military operations outside the Korean theater do not appear to be imminent although preparations are being made to move Chinese Communist troops into Tibet. There are continued indications of increasing Chinese Communist long-term preparations for support of the Viet Minh.
4. Available intelligence does not indicate Soviet intentions to initiate hostilities in Europe or the Near East in the immediate future but there are continuing indications of Soviet and Satellite preparations for war. The Soviet air strength in Germany is large and is steadily increasing.
5. The Soviet "Peace Offensive" appears to be superficial, and the indications of increasing Soviet cooperativeness with the West represent an employment of different tactics, designed to reduce the improvement of the power position of the West.


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ANALYSIS OF INDICATIONS

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. KOREA.

- (1) Political and Propaganda. There was no significant change during the week in Communist propaganda on the cease-fire discussions. Comment from North Korean, Chinese Communist and Soviet sources, up to the resumption of the truce discussions on 25 July, provided no indication that the Communists were prepared to withdraw their demand for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, although there was also no suggestion that they were preparing to break off the discussions. Soviet press comments continued to be limited to reprints of North Korean and Chinese Communist items reiterating that the withdrawal of foreign troops is essential to a settlement. TASS dispatches from Pyongyang during the week accused the American delegation at Kaesong of categorically refusing to discuss a troop withdrawal despite the fact that without such evacuation a "peaceful settlement of the Korean question is impossible," and quoted the North Korean contention that "the Korean people demand the withdrawal of foreign troops" and "insist on the final solution of this question." The Peiping radio on 24 July resumed its protests against continuing U.S. military action and charged that American planes had penetrated China's air space in the "most flagrant provocation of all." Despite this apparent uncompromising attitude, however, there were no threats in Communist propaganda that a failure to agree to their proposals would lead to breakdown of the discussions. The Communist position continues to appear to be designed to place the blame on the U.S. for any breakdown which might occur in the peace conference and to present themselves as the champions of peace.
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- (2) Ground. Although there is no firm indication of the enemy's future course of action, the Communists have continued to improve their capabilities for either a

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renewal of the offensive or the maintenance of a prolonged defense. Vehicle sightings have continued fairly high, averaging about 500 per day during the week. It is estimated that the enemy has been able, since 30 June, to stockpile sufficient supplies in forward areas to support a 45 division attack for 9 to 11 days or a 72 division attack for 5 to 7 days. The increased volume of enemy artillery fire, the forward displacement of artillery in the eastern sector of the front and reports of increased tank sightings are indicative of enemy readiness for a resumption of the offensive. Recent probing action of the enemy has shown his interest in the dispositions of U.S. troops, particularly in the east central sector, and PW's indicate a Communist attempt to maintain the offensive spirit of their troops. According to a field estimate, the present enemy situation is such that the preparations which normally have preceded previous offensives might not be necessary or could be accomplished very rapidly. The Communist forces are maintaining closer contact than in the past, the combat effectiveness of most units in contact indicates their probable employment in an offensive role, and weather conditions might permit the movement of reserves into attack positions without detection. Interrogation of PW's captured since 1 July has resulted in 16 reports indicating that the enemy is preparing for an offensive, and of these 7 have given dates ranging from 15 July to 19 August. [REDACTED] also allege that orders have been issued for a Communist attack if the U.S. does not meet their demands and that preparations are being made accordingly. A PW from the 27th CCF Army has stated, on the other hand, that the mission of this Army when it moved into the front on 15 July was to defend for six weeks.

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There continues to be no firm indication of the arrival of additional Chinese Communist units in Korea despite the numerous recent reports that substantial reinforcements have crossed the Yalu. There is a possibility, however, that a number of Chinese Communist armies, which have not been firmly identified, may actually be present in Korea and that CCF strength may be from 100,000 to 300,000 in excess of the present estimate of 262,000. In addition, there are fairly reliable reports that elements of the CCF 41st, 43d and 46th Armies may be moving northward from South China and are possibly destined for Korea.

According to recent reports of uncertain reliability, some 20 Soviet officers arrived in Pyongyang in late June, possibly as advisors for the cease-fire discussions; the Soviets have assumed control of Chinese Communist and North Korean communications; and Soviet military advisors

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to North Korean units are to be doubled by late August. An increase in Soviet advisors is possible, although not confirmed, but there continues to be no reliable evidence that Soviet military personnel, other than advisors and AAA troops, are present in Korea.

- (3) Air. Enemy air activity in Korea during the week was limited to several night interception operations by individual aircraft and one engagement between MIG-15's and U.S. Marine Corps jets. There were no firm indications that this activity is to be expanded. Airfield repair still continues at several locations in North Korea, however, and unconfirmed reports continue to mention the existence and training of an "international volunteer air force" in Manchuria. Reliable evidence indicates that the increase in enemy flak strength had maintained a steady rate up to about the time of the beginning of the Kaesong talks. Information is not yet available to determine whether or not this increase has continued.

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[REDACTED] is the latest in a series of unconfirmed reports indicating the presence of four-engine bombers in Manchuria and China. These reports, together with the sighting of a non-friendly B-29 type aircraft off Korea during May, support the belief that an undetermined number of TU-4's are in the Far East and probably have conducted flights in Manchuria, possibly for familiarization or training purposes. That a TU-4 unit is actually permanently stationed in Manchuria is considered unlikely.

b. JAPAN. There has been no new development in Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda with respect to the Japanese peace treaty and there continues to be no clear indication of any definite Soviet move to forestall its signing. The Soviet Union and Communist China have both reaffirmed their rejection of the proposed treaty. An official Chinese publication asserted that a peace treaty with Japan without Chinese Communist participation is illegal, invalid and entirely unacceptable to the Chinese people, while Pravda maintained that "everyone to whom peace is dear will reject the Japanese treaty draft as a threat to peace in the Far East."

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c. CHINA. There continues to be no evidence of preparations in South China for any immediate major military action and reports of plans to attack Chinmen remain unconfirmed. The collection drive for the purchase of military equipment, particularly aircraft, continues, however, and there are reports of additional air preparations in South China. [REDACTED] report the arrival of 50 aircraft at Canton, the completion of a weather station at Haikou Airfield on Hainan Island, and airfield construction work at Chin Hua in Chekiang Province. These reports may reflect some increase in Chinese Communist Air Force activity in China proper but they cannot be confirmed. Possibly connected with this information is a report that the Chinese-Soviet civil airline plans to extend its routes to Hainan Island and Tibet. Reports that an airstrip capable of supporting jet aircraft is being built at Chinwangtao, on the gulf of Chihli about 125 miles northwest of Taku, represent an extension of coastal defense between Antung and Tsingtao. With respect to Chinese Communist intentions in general, there continues to be no indication that they have relinquished any of their objectives in Asia or modified their aggressive program in connection with the Korean discussions. Reports continue to allege that Chinese Communist leaders anticipate and are preparing for world war.

d. TIBET. Available information indicates that the Chinese Communists are making preparations for, and may have begun, their occupation of Tibet. Broadcasts from Peiping and Chungking claim that Chinese Communist forces are advancing through Sikkim Province en route to Tibet, while orders have reportedly been issued to CCF troops at Changtu to prepare for the march to Tibet. Unconfirmed reports from the Indian press assert that small numbers of Chinese Communist troops are already in Tibet and that Communist agents are now operating on the Indian-Tibetan border.

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e. INDOCHINA. No major Viet Minh operations have taken place during the past week, and present Viet Minh dispositions and reports of recent losses indicate probable Viet Minh abstention from major offensive military action pending rehabilitation. Unconfirmed reports [REDACTED] continue to state that the Chinese Communists are preparing to intervene in Indochina but there is no reliable evidence that such action is imminent and the present rainy season is most unfavorable for major military action. The introduction of "volunteers" on an increasing scale, particularly after the rainy season, is, however, a definite possibility, and there are several indications that the Chinese Communists are continuing their long-term preparations for increased support of the Viet Minh. These developments include the work on the railroad to the Indochina border (which the Hong Kong press has stated is now completed), the reported build-up of aircraft supplies in South China, and continuing reports that the Chinese are working on airfields near the Indochina border. Meanwhile, the Ho Chi Minh radio this week broadcast, apparently without comment, the query of a Paris newspaper on the possibility of a cease-fire in Vietnam. There has been no other evidence that the Viet Minh are seeking negotiations and the significance of this single broadcast cannot be judged without more information.

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TOP SECRET**2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.****a. GERMANY-AUSTRIA.**

- (1) Soviet Ground Forces. Summer field training in the Soviet Zone of Germany continues to place primary emphasis on small unit and individual training, with indications that considerable effort is being devoted to river crossing exercises. Assembly of engineer units with bridging equipment has been reported at three different locations on the Elbe: in the Havelberg-Gloswen area, near Wittenberge; in the Jerichow area, near Tangermünde; and at Aken, near Dessau. Reports are too fragmentary to permit assessment at this time as to whether these activities merely reflect intensive river crossing training for engineer units alone or whether they foreshadow more comprehensive exercises involving all types of troops in one of these areas. No important changes in the disposition of Soviet ground force units have been reported. A report that in early July Soviet troops were observed crossing into Germany from Poland at Goerlitz (in the extreme southeast of the Soviet Zone) may indicate the arrival of reinforcements in the Soviet Zone, but the presence of two Soviet divisions -- one tank and one mechanized -- in training areas within a radius of 30 miles of Goerlitz suggests that exercises being conducted by these troops possibly gave rise to the observations. Estimates of local inhabitants that 40,000 to 50,000 troops were involved appear to be greatly exaggerated.

In Austria, the first reliable evidence has now been received that the departure of the 1927 class to the U.S.S.R. is under way. Consistent with earlier reports that this would occur in early July, some 2500 Soviet troops are reported already to have departed by rail from the Wilfleinsdorf transit center during the two-week period ending 11 July.

- (2) Soviet Air. The aircraft count of the 24th Air Army in the Soviet Zone of Germany during the past month has remained fairly stable, except with respect to jet fighters which increased from 510 to 550 during June, thus maintaining the same rate of increase noted for some months. There was also an increase in the number of two-place MIG-type trainer aircraft. Activity in the 24th Air Army has been high and certain changes in the disposition of jet fighters appear to indicate an extensive maneuver activity, probably connected with the ground maneuvers now in progress in several areas. It has now been reliably established that the Type 27 twin-jet bomber is equipped to carry external wing tanks. This will increase the radius of action of this aircraft from an estimated 575 to approximately 700 miles.

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The observation of an additional dummy radar at Flauen makes the sixth radar observed along the western border of the Soviet Zone of Germany. A seventh site has been reported but is not yet confirmed. The new sites are considerably removed from airfield area, indicating probable utilization for early warning coverage, although it is also possible that these radars are positioned temporarily for maneuvers. Fairly reliable reports of 50 mm AA guns on two airfields in the Soviet Zone may indicate that these guns are replacing or supplementing the present 37 mm guns. Although the reported arrival of 50 mm guns in the Zone was reported in October, this is the first evidence of their employment.

Of the seven new runways under construction in the Soviet Zone, work is progressing steadily at five where about one-third of the cement laying has been completed, while at the other two cement laying has not yet begun.

In Austria, there has been no further evidence of re-equipment of fighter or light bomber regiments with modern aircraft. The jet fighter division at Wiener-Neustadt, with 67 jet fighters and trainers, is conducting normal training operations.

b. SATELLITES.

- (1) Bulgaria. There are indications that call-ups of Bulgarian reservists during 1951 are on a far larger scale than in previous years. The major categories of reservists being called are signal personnel, motor vehicle drivers, and tank and artillery specialists, with particular emphasis on the latter. Although some reports have indicated that the reservist call-up is for refresher training of 30 to 40 days, others indicating that new regiments are being formed from reservists suggest that many are being held for longer periods. Meanwhile two of the three divisions of the Third Bulgarian Army are reported concentrated along most of the Turkish frontiers, with units of the Second Army along the eastern part of the Greek frontier. Evidence that caretaking parties are still in permanent garrisons, however, suggests that the reported moves are for training purposes rather than to effect a major redeployment.
- (2) Czechoslovakia-Hungary. Recent field trips by competent military observers in Hungary and Czechoslovakia indicate that no unusual military activity is under way in the areas covered. A Western military attache observed nothing unusual between the Rumanian border and Budapest.

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and another observer noted no unusual army or air activity on a five-day trip through Moravia and Slovakia. A recent observation of a somewhat unusual number of vehicles in the Susice and Sumava areas of western Czechoslovakia (both known maneuver areas) probably reflect training exercises.

c. YUGOSLAVIA. The attack on Tito by Molotov during the course of his 21 July address at the Polish "Liberation Day" ceremonies does not appear to have immediate significance in terms of increased Soviet hostility towards Yugoslavia. Molotov reiterated the well-worn Cominform line that Yugoslavia has become a capitalist pawn under Tito and that this cannot last long as the Yugoslavs would "find a way to freedom and the liquidation of the fascist Tito regime." The Cominform Journal has predicted previously that Tito would be overthrown internally. An analysis of Soviet intentions towards Yugoslavia made by General Popovic, Yugoslav Chief of Staff, prior to Molotov's statement reflected Yugoslav feeling that their country would not be attacked by outside forces simply to wipe out the regime, but that such an attack if it occurred would be part of overall global hostilities.

d. NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST.

(1) Iran. There are no clear indications of unusual Soviet military activity on the Iranian frontier. According to two recent reports, box cars parked along the rail line between Ashkhabad and Khakhe (east of the Caspian) do not reflect a military build-up but are for the housing of Soviet farm workers temporarily in the area. There are indications that the Soviets may initially attempt to penetrate Iranian oil operations through the employment of oil technicians from the Satellites. A recent report that Iran has received an offer from an integrated team of 150 highly qualified technicians from the Soviet-controlled Austrian fields tends to confirm a previous report that the Soviets were recruiting technicians in Austria for work in Iran. In addition, it has been reported that agents from Soviet-controlled oil marketing organizations in Austria are soliciting markets in Western Europe for Near East oil. An apparent decision to attempt intervention indirectly may have stemmed from a belief that offers of Satellite aid would be considered more favorably than would the direct offer of Russian technicians.

(2) Afghanistan. There are indications of increased Soviet activity in Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
contrary to normal Soviet practice, Embassy personnel and members of the Soviet trading delegation in Kabul have tended to move out of the diplomatic compound.

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Presumably this step has been taken to give them easier access to the population which has been repressed in its efforts to found a "People's Party." Meanwhile the Soviets are reported to have replaced the population in a wide belt on the Soviet side of the Amu Darya river (bordering Afghanistan) with people unrelated to the adjacent Afghans. The motive for this may be to inhibit clandestine border crossings and the measure is a normal Soviet security precaution.

3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.

a. **REEMERGENCE OF SOVIET MILITARY LEADERS.** The past week was marked by the reemergence of two formerly outstanding Soviet military leaders, both of whom have a knowledge of the West based on wartime operations. Marshal Zhukov, who appeared with Molotov as a principal speaker at the Polish Liberation Day celebrations in Warsaw, has been in relative obscurity for some time. His appearance is the first indication in recent years that he is again in good standing, although to date there has been no evidence that he is to be assigned to a major military post (his last known position was that of Commander of the relatively unimportant Ural Military District). The other officer, Vice Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, has been appointed Minister of the Navy to succeed Admiral Yumashev. In 1948, Kuznetsov was court-martialed for revealing military information to the British during World War II and was dropped in rank. The reason for his apparent restoration to favor is not known, although he is considered a more competent officer than his predecessor. Available evidence is insufficient to establish the full significance of the reemergence of these two officers. Although both had reputations for being cooperative with the West so that their reappearance might fit into a projected Soviet tactic for more cordial relations with the West, their reemergence more likely reflects a need for competent professional rather than political leadership in the armed forces.

b. **GENERAL PROPAGANDA.** There has been no change in the general Soviet propaganda line, which remains hostile to the U.S. This was reflected in the speeches of Molotov and Zhukov at Warsaw, neither of whom were conciliatory toward the West or indicated any design to decrease East-West tension. At Helsinki, the Soviet-sponsored meeting of the Bureau of the World Peace Council, following its previous formula, adopted a resolution noting the aggravation of international tension caused by the U.S. arms drive, the failure of the Paris conference, the rearming of Germany and Japan, the increase of U.S. naval and military bases, and "new conflicts in the Middle East." The resolution then called for a quick cease-fire in Korea to be followed by the signing of a Big Five peace pact which would return the United Nations to its true mission, bring about a general disarmament and restore international collaboration as a basis for a lasting peace. Although Soviet objectives probably remain unchanged, a possible change in Soviet tactics may be indicated by the emergence of the English language

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"News" (see Watch Committee Report #50), purportedly designed to improve Soviet relations with the Anglo-American world; the agreement of Pravda to publish a statement of British Foreign Minister Herbert Morrison; and possibly by the Soviet acceptance of the ECE invitation to attend preliminary East-West trade talks. The decision to attend was represented by the Soviets as having been made at a high level and the attendance of important officials of the Ministry of Trade was cited as evidence of Soviet sincerity. Despite these assertions, the acceptance actually represents no change in Soviet policy and is probably designed to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Western European countries on the issue of exports of strategic materials to the Soviet bloc.

c. **SOVIET HAM STATIONS ALLEGEDLY SILENCED.** According to a Norwegian press report, Soviet radio "hams" had been off the air for a two-week period prior to 12 July. The paper suggested that such a development usually precedes political or military events of great importance. Limited available evidence from other sources tends to indicate that Western contact with Soviet radio ham stations has declined over the past several months although the total cessation of operations by the Soviet stations has not been verified. No conclusions can be reached at present as to whether this development, even if true, is of any significance.

for: B. J. Talley, C. F.
JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General, GSC
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